We give a relation between a logic of knowledge and change, with a semantics on Kripke models, and a logic of knowledge and time, with a semantics on interpreted systems. In particular, given an epistemic state (pointed Kripke model with equivalence relations) and a formula in a dynamic epistemic logic (a logic describing the consequences of epistemic actions), we construct an interpreted system relative to that epistemic state and that formula that satisfies the translation of the formula into a temporal epistemic logic. The construction involves that the protocol that is implicit in the dynamic epistemic formula, i.e., the set of sequences of actions being executed to evaluate the formula, is made explicit. We first focus on the logic of knowledge and change that is known as public announcement logic, then generalize our results to a dynamic epistemic logic.
Introduction
Epistemic logic is a formalization of knowledge. Seminal work in this area is Hintikka's [9] , from 1962, and since then many philosophers have been interested in further developing the notions of knowledge and belief using a possible world semantics. In the late 1980s these approaches were picked up and further developed by computer scientists, cf. [8, 4] . This development was originally motivated by the need to reason about communication protocols. One is typically interested in what different parties to a protocol know before, during and after a run (an execution sequence) of the protocol. This interest in change of knowledge over time is already eminent in this area for twenty years. Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi's seminal Reasoning about Knowledge [4] is a culmination of several earlier papers in this area, and also incorporates Halpern and Vardi's 1986 paper [8] The Complexity of Reasoning about Knowledge and Time. Apart from computer science, there is much interest in the temporal dynamics of knowledge and belief in areas as diverse as artificial intelligence [15] , multiagent systems [20] , philosophy [1] and game theory [2] .
The central notion in the work of Fagin et al. [4] is that of an interpreted system.
is not generally the case. Pacuit [16] compares the history-based approach by Parikh and Ramanujam [17] to interpreted systems, with runs. This addresses the relation between Kripke models with histories consisting of event sequences and interpreted systems. It handles partial observability of agents, when they perceive only some but not all of a sequence of events, but does not address the partial observability common in dynamic epistemics, where only an aspect of an event is observable. A more recent work by van Benthem et al. [26] , rooted in older work [25, 24] , gives a systematic and precise relation between TEL (corresponding to Epistemic Temporal Logic in their notation) and DEL. They provide a representation theorem characterizing the largest class of temporal epistemic models corresponding to dynamic epistemic protocols in terms of notions of Perfect Recall, No Miracles, and Bisimulation Invariance. Also they give an axiomatization for a public announcement logic constrained by protocols, and study the issues of completeness and decidability of that logic. In their approach, starting from an initial (pointed) epistemic model, a TEL model is generated by repeatedly applying updates with event models (or, action models). Sequences of pointed event models closed under initial segment relations forms a DEL protocol. We have applied their elegant approach on representing protocols. We do not assume a parameter set of allowed protocols, as they do, but instead compute a protocol from a given DEL formula.
Other work on relating DEL with TEL focuses on the TEL feature to refer to past actions. Recent work by Hoshi and Yap [10] extends the public announcement logic constrained by protocols in [26] with full class of event models and a past-time operator; a new method is introduced for axiomatization. And Sack [21] also adds a past-time operator to public announcement logic and DEL, but without protocols.
Motivation
Our motivation to find links between DEL and TEL is model checking. Much recent work in model checking multiagent systems is based on TEL. State-of-the-art model checkers are MCMAS [19] , MCK [5] , VerICS [12] and MCTK [22] . As far as we know, DEMO [32] is currently the only model checker based on DEL. In a previous study [31] , we address a relation between TEL and DEL by specifying and checking a communication protocol that solves the Russian Cards problem [28] in three model checkers: MCK, MCMAS and DEMO. We encode public announcement logic into temporal epistemics by way of explicitly introducing boolean state variables for each announcement with values corresponding to unknown (i.e., before the announcement is made), and true (after a truthful announcement). In another study [29] , we discuss an inherent difficulty of specifying the Sum-and-Product riddle in temporal epistemic model checkers such as MCK and MCMAS. In MCK, a state of the environment is an assignment to a set of variables declared in the environment section. These variables are usually assumed to be partially accessible to the individual agents, and agents could share some variables. The change of the state of the multi-agent system is either made by agents or the environment, in the form of changing these variables. In both cases, we need guarded statements to make the change. For example, a simple deterministic statement has the form:
where command C is eligible for execution only if the corresponding condition cond evaluates to true in the current state, otherwise, the command Co will be executed. If we would like to model the Sum-and-Product riddle in MCK, the effect of a public announcement should be recorded in a variable which is accessible to all agents. But unfortunately, even though MCK can check epistemic postconditions, it only supports checking propositional formulas as preconditions in cond (e.g., an epistemic formula K i ϕ or a temporal formula ϕ is not allowed in cond). An explanation lies in the process of constructing interpreted systems during model checking. While the truth of a propositional formula only depends on a single state, that of an epistemic or temporal formula relies on other possible states which may have not yet been generated during the process. So in [29] , we only analyze the Sum-and-Product riddle in public announcement logic and solve it using the dynamic epistemic model checker DEMO.
Luo et al. [14] reduce a model checking problem in public announcement logic to a series of Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) based computations of the set of states that satisfies a given epistemic formula. They apply this to model checking the Sumand-Product riddle. The result is checked in BDD-based model checker MCTK and the model checking time is 90 seconds, which is an impressive improvement over 1864 seconds obtained by using DEMO, which is not based on BDD method, on the same computer. This suggests that BDD-based temporal epistemic model checkers may have better efficiency than DEL-based methods.
The investigations in [31, 29, 14] motivated us to have a more systematic analysis between model checking in DEL versus model checking in TEL. We provide that correspondence in the following sense: given an epistemic state (pointed Kripke model with equivalence relations) and a formula in a DEL, we construct an interpreted system relative to that epistemic state and that formula that satisfies the translation of the formula into a TEL. The construction involves that the protocol that is implicit in the dynamic epistemic formula, i.e., the set of sequences of actions being executed to evaluate the formula, is made explicit. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the fundamentals of logical languages and structures involved. Section 3 presents our results for public announcement logic. We translate all formulas with announcements into a TEL, and prove a theorem that identifies the truth of such a dynamic epistemic formula in a world of a Kripke model, with the truth of a temporal epistemic formula in a global state of a corresponding interpreted system. Section 4 provides a generalization of these results from public announcement logic to DEL with detailed proofs.
Logical Preliminaries
We introduce four structural primitives and two languages. The structures are:
• State models, which are Kripke models with equivalence relations representing agents' knowledge about states;
• Action models, which are Kripke models with equivalence relations representing agents' knowledge about actions;
• Forest models, which are Kripke models with not only accessibility relations representing agents' knowledge of states but also accessibility relations representing state transitions; • Action-based interpreted systems, which are interpreted systems with transitions labelled with actions.
The reason that we restrict state models and action models to have only equivalence relations is because the framework we want to relate it to, namely that of action-based interpreted systems, has equivalence relations. The languages are those of DEL and a variant of TEL which one could think of as "next-time temporal epistemic logic". The former can be given meaning both on state models and on forest models; the latter both on forest models and on action-based interpreted systems. As global parameters to both the languages and the structures we have a set Ag of n agents, and a (countable) set Q of atoms q. An action model A is a structure W, {∼ i | i ∈ Ag}, pre where W is a domain of actions, and ∼ i is an equivalence relation on W 2 expressing the actions that are indistinguishable from each other by agent i ∈ Ag, and pre : W → L is a precondition function that assigns a precondition pre(a) in language L to each a ∈ W. We call (A, a) a pointed action model where A is an action model and a ∈ W.
Structures
A state model captures all the possible states that agents could think of at a particular moment and their knowledge about these states. It represents a static view of a system. An action model captures similar aspects in terms of actions, instead of states. An action has a precondition, which must be satisfied in a state if this action is executable in that state. An action model transforms the states of a system by executing actions on these states. This will be introduced as an update product operation in Section 2.3. A pointed state model (M, w) uses w to denote the actual state. Similar for pointed action models.
To represent both states and changes of a system in a single model, we introduce a structure that combines states and actions.
Definition 2.2 (Forest Model)
Given a set of actions W, a forest model is a structure
• W is a set of states; [26] in the sense that (w, a 1 , . . . , a m ) can be seen as a (partial) history. To associate a forest model with an interpreted system, we extend the interpreted system of [4] with actions. Definition 2.3 (Action-based Interpreted System) Given a set of actions W, an action-based interpreted system is a structure
• G is a set of global states; a global state s ∈ G is a tuple s = (s e , s 1 , . . . , s n ) where s e is the state of the environment and for i ∈ Ag, s i is the local state of agent i; • R is a set of runs over G; a run r is an infinite sequence of global states; the pair (r, m) consisting of a run and a time point is also referred to as a point, and r(m) is a global state associated with the point (r, m); • → a is a binary relation on points in a run; for two consecutive points (r, m) and (r, m + 1), there exists a unique action a ∈ W such that (r, m) → a (r, m + 1); • π is a valuation function which decides for each global state s a set of atoms P ⊆ Q that are true in s; the valuation of a point (r, m) is simply π(r(m)).
Let r(m) = s be the global state at time m in run r, then with r i (m) we mean local state s i . Two points (r, m) and (r ′ , m ′ ) are indistinguishable for i, written as
, the local states of their associated global states are the same for i).
Note that a point is only associated with a global state, but a global state can be associated with multiple points. Action relation → a only relates the consecutive points in the same run, but two runs may overlap in the sense that r(m) = r ′ (m ′ ) and r(m + 1) = r ′ (m ′ + 1).
Languages
The language L DEL of Dynamic Epistemic Logic is inductively defined as follows
where q ∈ Q, i ∈ Ag, B ⊆ Ag, (A, a) a pointed action model, and precondition function pre is defined on W → L DEL such that a can not occur inside pre(a). The usual abbreviations for ⊤, ∨, → are employed.
The language L DEL is an extension of the language of epistemic logic with dynamic modalities parameterized by action models. In this paper, we assume that all points of all action models are differently named, so that we can uniquely associate a particular a with the pointed model (A, a) whenever convenient. The extra requirement on precondition function prevents self-reference, e.g.,
For the special case of singleton action models with reflexive accessibility relations for all agents, i.e., public announcements, we write [ϕ]ψ where ϕ is the precondition (the announced formula).
We want to connect L DEL to a temporal epistemic language. The dynamic part of L DEL is the action modality and it can be seen as representing one time step. Our approach is to associate each action modality with a one-step temporal modality. So we define the language of Next-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (NTEL).
The language L NTEL of NTEL is inductively defined as follows.
where, q ∈ Q, i ∈ Ag, B ⊆ Ag, and a ∈ W. The usual abbreviations for ⊤, ∨, → are employed.
Note that both L DEL and L NTEL have common knowledge, while in [26] , they left out common knowledge from their temporal public announcement logic TPAL. This difference reflects different focus. [26] focuses on studying axiomatization, completeness and decidability problems of TPAL, and common knowledge adds more complexity for these problems. While in this paper, we focus on model checking, and common knowledge can be handled relatively easily.
Semantics
In the following, we give meaning to the formulas of the languages over the structures we have introduced. More specifically, we interpret DEL formulas over state models and forest models, and interpret NTEL formulas over forest models and action-based interpreted systems. See Fig. 1 .
We distinguish four different interpretations. |= sd denotes the interpretation of a DEL formula over a state model; |= fd denotes the interpretation of a DEL formula over a forest model; |= ft denotes the interpretation of an NTEL formula over a forest model; and |= it denotes the interpretation of an NTEL formula over an action-based interpreted system. All these interpretations are defined similarly in terms of atomic propositions, logical connectives and knowledge modalities, which we assume to be familiar [4, 30] . We focus on clauses of action executions, and the temporal connectives. For action executions, we also mention the special case of public announcement.
State Models Forest Models
Action-based Interpreted Systems 
where ⊗ is the update operation, which we define next.
The update operation is a function mapping a state model and an action model to a new state model. Given a state model M = W, {∼ i | i ∈ Ag}, π and an action model
This definition is essentially the same as in [3] . In the special case of public announcement, in which the announcement of formula ϕ corresponds to a singleton action model, say (A 0 , a 0 ), we have:
In the special case of public announcement, in which the announcement of formula ϕ corresponds to (A 0 , a 0 ), we have:
The condition "[ϕ] corresponds to a 0 " is essential. If it does not hold, we can get into trouble, as the following example explains. 
This property of |= fd may seem a bit strange. Essentially, this is because we do not yet enforce any connection of an announcement modality and an action in the forest model. We will see later (Definition 3.5) that formula p → [p]⊤ does hold in a special class of forest models that relate to this formula (see Example 3.10).
The reason to make a link between syntax and semantics is because later the syntactic translation from L DEL to L NTEL needs a correspondence so that we can associate it to the semantic transformation. Note that a similar point is made in [26] in state-dependent DEL protocols and in the context of their public announcement logic constrained with protocols.
Next, we define the meanings of the formulas with 'next-time' temporal operators in the following way.
Definition 2.9 (Semantics |= ft ) The semantics of a temporal formula a ϕ on a forest model M is as follows:
Here stands for an existential branching next-time operator (see [27] ), parameterized by actions a. The formula a ϕ intuitively means that there exists a branch such that the transition to the next time point is labelled by a and ϕ is true there. According to this definition, a ϕ ∧ a ¬ϕ is satisfiable, as one could imagine that there is a state w with two a successors in one of which ϕ is true and in the other ϕ is false. But we will show that this is not satisfiable in a special class of forest models, to be given in Definition 3.5.
Let I = (G, R, {→ a |a ∈ W}, π) be an action-based interpreted system. "Runs r and r ′ are equivalent up to time m" means that the initial segments of r and r ′ are the same from 0 to m, i.e., r(0) = r ′ (0) up to r(m) = r ′ (m). Choosing the bundle semantics as in [27] , we now define the meaning of a ϕ over an action-based interpreted system. Definition 2.10 (Semantics |= it ) The semantics for a ϕ on an action-based interpreted systems I is as follows, (I, r, m) |= it a ϕ iff there is a run r ′ that is equivalent to r up to time m,
This shows a connection of action and time as in (r ′ , m) → a (r ′ , m + 1). Note that action relation → a only relates two consecutive points in the same run, although it may seem to connect two points (r, m) and (r ′ , m + 1) in different runs. We show later that an action-based interpreted system is associated with a generated forest model, in which case a run corresponds to a branch in a forest model. Since an action 'a' may relate two worlds that both belong to two branches in a forest model, there can be two runs going through the two corresponding global states, where an overlap occurs with '→ a '.
Public Announcements
In this section, we deal with the case of public announcement action models and the fragment of L DEL for public announcement, referred to as
Given a formula ϕ in L PAL , and a pointed state model (M, w), we want to simulate checking the truth of ϕ in (M, w) by checking the truth of a corresponding next-time temporal epistemic formula in a corresponding action-based interpreted system. The action-based interpreted system should encode not only (M, w) but also the dynamics that is implicitly present in ϕ in the form of public announcement operators. It is therefore relative to both ϕ and (M, w). In other words, we are looking for a syntactic translation syn (with type: L PAL → L NTEL ) and a semantic transformation sem such that:
The image of the actual world w under sem (a global state s w ) is entirely determined by the role of w in M . It is therefore sufficient to determine sem(M, ϕ):
M, w |= sd ϕ iff sem(M, ϕ), s w |= it syn(ϕ).
Syntactic translation
The L PAL formulas are translated to L NTEL formulas in the following way.
Given that every announcement modality has a different action name, we define a translation syn from L PAL to L NTEL as follows:
where action a is the name of [ϕ] within [ϕ]ψ.
The last clause associates the announcement modality [ϕ] with the temporal modality a . It simulates the checking of an L PAL formula [ϕ]ψ over a state model with semantics |= sd (Definition 2.6) in the context of L NTEL . Observe that ¬(syn(ϕ) ∧ ¬ a syn(ψ)) is equivalent to the implication syn(ϕ) → a syn(ψ), and we will use the latter in the rest of our paper due to its succinctness.
We assume that every announcement modality has a different action name, so even when two announcements are of the same formula, they still get different names. For this reason, we introduce a simple procedure to mark the announcement modalities so that they get a unique name. We mark the m announcements occurring in a formula with indexes from 1 to m in the order of occurrence of their left '[' bracket, when reading the formula from left to right. Then we associate each modality with index j with action a j . Here is an example to explain this translation method. 
The dynamics implicitly present in PAL formula ϕ can be identified with the set of all sequences of public announcements that may need to be evaluated in order to determine the truth of ϕ. As this is known as a protocol [16, 26] , we call this the protocol of a formula ϕ. It can be determined from ϕ and is therefore another syntactic feature that we can address before applying it in the semantic transformation sem((M, w), ϕ).
The protocol of a PAL formula is defined by induction on the formula structure.
prot(q)
:
where, a is the name for the announcement of ϕ in [ϕ]ψ, and aprot(ψ) = {a} if prot(ψ) is empty, otherwise aprot(ψ) = {aa 1 . . . a m | a 1 . . . a m ∈ prot(ψ)}, i.e., the concatenation of a to all sequences in the nonempty set prot(ψ). For a protocol variable we use P.
Note that a 'protocol' in this paper is used differently from that in [26] , where a DEL protocol is defined as a set of sequences of pointed event models closed under an initial segment relation. In our case, prot(ψ) is not closed under an initial segment relation. The protocol of a formula would be closed under an initial segment relation if the last clause is changed to prot([ϕ]ψ) ::= prot(ϕ) ∪ aprot(ψ) ∪ {a}. In the proposition linking DEL and TEL in [26] , they assume the protocol of all finite sequences of DEL event models. We, instead, take a minimalistic approach, only reading a protocol off ϕ which is needed for model checking. 
Semantic transformation
The required semantic transformation sem in sem(M, ϕ) is determined in two steps. First, we construct the forest model f(M, prot(ϕ)) from the state model M and the protocol prot(ϕ) of the public announcement formula ϕ in a similar way as in [24, 26] . Then we determine an action-based interpreted system is(M ′ ) corresponding to a forest model M ′ . We then simply define sem(M, ϕ) as is(f(M, prot(ϕ))). Definition 3.5 (Generated Forest Models) Given a state model M = W, {∼ i | i ∈ Ag}, π , w ∈ W , and a protocol P = prot(ϕ) generated from PAL formula ϕ, a generated forest model f(M, P) is defined in three steps.
(1) Let a 1 · · · a m be a sequence of actions in protocol P, and suppose that these actions belong to public announcement models A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A m respectively. Let M j be the state model M ⊗ A 1 · · · ⊗ A j , which is the result of announcing a 1 to a • w → a (w, a) for any w, (w, a) ∈ W ′ ; • π ′ (w) = π(w) for the unique M k such that w ∈ W M k & π belongs to M k . Note that the uniqueness is guaranteed by the fact that W M , W M1 , · · · , and W Mm form a partition of W ′ .
(2) Define a union ⊎ of two forest models. Given forest model
The construction can be seen as building a forest model by repeatedly merging a state model and the modal product of that model and a singleton 'action model' corresponding to an announcement, and then unifying these forest models. We refer to the next section for an example illustrating this procedure.
Next, from such a forest model we determine an action-based interpreted system. This is based on a fairly intuitive idea. Each world in a forest model is associated with a global state. This can be achieved by keeping that world as the value of the environmental state and for each agent the set of indistinguishable worlds as the value of that agent's local state. The valuation π remains as it was. For a world w in a state model M = W, {∼ i | i ∈ Ag}, π this recipe delivers a corresponding global state s = (w, w ∼1 , . . . , w ∼n ), where w ∼i is the i-equivalence class containing w, i.e., {w ′ ∈ W | w ′ ∼ i w}. The same recipe applies, in principle, to worlds (w, a 1 , . . . , a m ) in the forest model f(M, prot(ϕ)), but here we can somewhat simplify matters by observing that (i) the environment is fully determined by the w in (w, a 1 , . . . , a m ) because all events (such as announcements) are defined relative to their combined effect on the agents only, and by observing that (ii) public announcements are fully observable by all agents so we can represent them as global parameters. In the following we use (w, w ∼1 , . . . , w ∼n , a 1 , . . . , a m ) to denote the global state
Definition 3.6 (Forest Model to Action-based Interpreted System) Given a forest model M = W, {∼ i | i ∈ Ag}, {→ a |a ∈ W}, π , we associate M with an action-based interpreted system I, also written as is(M ), which is a structure G, R, {→ a |a ∈ W ∪ {a ⊥ }}, π defined as follows. . For each state in forest model M that for no a ∈ W has a → a successor, we define a run r ∈ R. Suppose (w, a 1 , . . . , a k ) is such a state in M , then the associated run r is defined as follows:
• r(0) = (w, w ∼1 , . . . , w ∼n );
• r(i) = (w, w ∼1 , . . . , w ∼n , a 1 , . . . , a i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k ; r(i) = r(i − 1), otherwise;
The valuations correspond: π(r(i)) = π(w), i.e., all the states in a run have the same valuation.
It is easy to see that each run is essentially a branch of the corresponding forest model. Since a branch of a forest mode is finite but a run is infinite, we introduce a special action a ⊥ to represent the action of doing nothing, which does not change any global state.
Example
We illustrate the syntactic translation and the semantic transformations defined in the previous sections through the following example.
Consider two agents 1 and 2 and two facts q and r. Agent 1 knows whether q but is uncertain about the truth of r, whereas agent 2 knows whether r but is uncertain about the truth of q. The agents are commonly aware of each other's factual knowledge and ignorance. In fact, both q and r are true. This is modelled by the following state model (call it M init ). 
We can verify that both
This example explains both the syntactic translation and semantic transformation. In next section, we show their tight connection with ' |= sd ' and ' |= it '.
Theoretical results
We show, in three steps, the equivalence The first step is to show that given a state model M and a PAL formula ϕ, the interpretation of ϕ over (M, w) is equivalent to its interpretation over f(M, prot(ϕ)) which is the forest model built from M and ϕ. The second step is to show that ϕ and its syntactic translation syn(ϕ) are equivalent when they are both interpreted over the forest model f (M, prot(ϕ) ). The third, last, step is to show that the interpretation of syn(ϕ) over an arbitrary forest model and its corresponding interpreted system are equivalent. We explain these steps in three propositions: Proposition 3.9, Proposition 3.11, and Proposition 3.12.
All the proofs are omitted here, as we will generalize these propositions in Section 4.1 and give full proofs there.
We first give a lemma about some important features of generated forest models.
Lemma 3.7
Given a state model M and PAL formulas ϕ, ψ, the following equivalences hold:
This lemma shows special properties of the forest models generated from a state model and a PAL formula. In the case of formula ϕ ∧ ψ and [ϕ]ψ, the truth value of ϕ is solely decided by the forest model f(M, prot(ϕ)), which is a sub-model of both
We give the following example to explain the idea more intuitively.
Example 3.8
As we have shown in Section 3.3, the forest model
As a sub-model, the forest model
consists of all the states in the lower two rows, and the forest model f(M init , prot([r]K 1 r)) consists of all the states in the first and second columns. Clearly, the common states of these two forest models are w 01 , w 11 , w 00 and w 10 , which are exactly those states in model M init . We evaluate the second conjunct of
It is easy to verify that r is true in w 11 and there is an a 3 -successor (w 11 , a 3 ) in which K 1 r is true. Since all a 3 -successors can only be included in the forest f(M init , prot([r]K 1 r)) and there are no epistemic links to the rest of the states, we conclude that the evaluation of [r]K 1 r in the state w 11 of the model f(M init , prot([r]K 1 r)) is the same. We can do a similar analysis for the evaluation of syn( This result shows that we can either evaluate a PAL formula in a state model, or alternatively construct a 'supermodel' that already contains all future dynamic developments labelled by actions. Our formulation, relative to a formula ϕ to be evaluated, is different from the standard semantic form. For a description of the technique see Venema's chapter 'Dynamic Models in their Logical Surroundings' (in particular page 122) in [25] , or [24, 26] .
As the following example shows, the "special class of forest models" mentioned in Example 2.8 is in fact f(M, prot(ϕ)). This also gives an intuitive explanation of why Proposition 3.9 holds. The next result says that a formula ϕ ∈ L PAL and its translation syn(ϕ) ∈ L NTEL are equivalent when they are interpreted over the same forest model.
Proposition 3.11
Given a state model M and a PAL formula ϕ:
We now turn to the third result.
Proposition 3.12
For every executable ϕ ∈ L NTEL (i.e., a formula of the form syn(ψ) with ψ ∈ L PAL ), and every forest model M constructed from ψ with some initial state model, we have:
We now have the main result from Propositions 3.9, 3.11, and 3.12.
Theorem 3.13 Given a state model M , and a PAL formula ϕ,
Generalization
We now generalize the results in the previous section from public announcements as in [ϕ] ψ to action models as in [A, a]ψ.
We define a translation syn from L DEL to L NTEL as follows:
It is easy to see that the clause for public announcement (see Definition 3.1) is a special case.
We then have the protocol of a DEL formula.
Definition 4.2 (Protocol of DEL formula)
The protocol of a DEL formula is defined by induction on the formula structure. The cases of q, ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ, K i ϕ, C B ϕ are the same as in Definition 3.3.
where D(A) is the domain of the action model, which includes the point a, and bprot(ψ) = {b} if prot(ψ) is empty, otherwise, bprot(ψ) = {ba 1 . . . a m | a 1 . . . a m ∈ prot(ψ)}, i.e., the concatenation of b to all sequences in the set of prot(ψ).
Here we take a union for all b ∈ D(A) because they will all be used in building the forest models that will be introduced shortly. It is easy to see that Definition 3.3 is a special case, as the public announcement model has a singleton domain.
Next, we generalize Definition 3.5 as follows.
Definition 4.3 (Generated Forest Models: the General Case) Given a state model M = W, {∼ i | i ∈ Ag}, π , w ∈ W , and a protocol P = prot(ϕ) generated from DEL formula ϕ. The forest model f(M, P) is defined in three steps.
(1) Let a 1 · · · a m be a sequence of actions in protocol P, and suppose that these actions belongs to action models A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A m respectively. Let M j be the state model M ⊗A 1 · · ·⊗A j , which is the result of updating A 1 to A j subsequently on M ; let
e., the set of states from subsequent updates;
• ∼ • w → a (w, a) for any w, (w, a) ∈ W ′ ; • π ′ (w) = π(w) for the unique M k such that w ∈ W M k & π belongs to M k . Note that the uniqueness is guaranteed by the fact that W M , W M1 , · · · , and W Mm form a partition of W ′ .
(2) We define a union ⊎ of two forest models. Given forest model
Definition 3.6, on the transformation from forest models to action-based interpreted systems, does not need to be generalized, as we do not put any special restriction on forest models in that definition.
Theoretical results
This section generalizes the results in Section 3.4 and presents detailed proofs. We first give a generalization of Lemma 3.7.
Lemma 4.4
Given a state model M and DEL formulas ϕ, ψ, the following equivalences hold:
Proof. Let a state model M and DEL formulas ϕ, ψ be given.
Case i: We first prove the direction ⇒. Suppose f(M, prot(ϕ ∧ ψ)), w |= fd ϕ, we have f(M, prot(ϕ) ∪ prot(ψ)), w |= fd ϕ. It follows that f(M, prot(ϕ)) ⊎ f(M, prot(ψ)), w |= fd ϕ. Suppose the domain of f(M, prot(ϕ)) is W 1 , and that of f(M, prot(ψ)) is W 2 , then according to the forest model construction in Definition 4.3, we have W 1 ∩ W 2 = W M , i.e., the set of common states between these two forests is the set of the states in model M .
There are two cases for formula ϕ: either it contains no action modalities (then its truth value can be solely decided by the states in M ), or it contains action modalities that correspond only to the actions in f(M, prot(ϕ)), therefore its truth value can be decided solely by f(M, prot(ϕ)). In both cases, the truth value of ϕ can be solely decided in f(M, prot(ϕ)), so we have f(M, prot(ϕ)), w |= fd ϕ.
The direction ⇐ follows from a similar reasoning.
We distinguish two cases of pre(a): either pre(a) contains no action modalities, or it contains action modalities that correspond only to the actions in f(M, prot(pre(a))). In both cases, the truth value of pre(a) is solely decided by f(M, prot(pre(a))), so we have f(M, prot(pre(a))), w |= fd pre(a).
The direction ⇐ follows from a similar reasoning. This lemma shows special properties of the forest models generated from a state model and a DEL formula. In the case of formula ϕ ∧ ψ, the truth value of ϕ is solely decided by the forest model f(M, prot(ϕ)), which is a sub-model of f(M, prot(ϕ ∧ ψ)). In the case of formula [A, a]ψ), the truth value of pre(a) is solely decided by the forest model f(M, prot(pre(a))), which is a sub-model of f (M, prot([A, a]ψ) ).
We show, in three steps, the equivalence M, w |= sd ϕ iff sem(M, ϕ), s w |= it syn(ϕ).
The main difference is that ϕ is now a DEL formula instead of a PAL formula. The first step (Proposition 4.5) shows that given a state model M and a DEL formula ϕ, the interpretation of ϕ over (M, w) is equivalent to its interpretation over f(M, prot(ϕ)) which is the forest model built from M and ϕ. The second step (Proposition 4.6) shows that ϕ and its syntactic translation syn(ϕ) are equivalent when they are both interpreted over the forest model f(M, prot(ϕ)). The third step (Proposition 4.7) shows that the interpretation of syn(ϕ) over an arbitrary forest model and its corresponding interpreted system are equivalent. M, w |= sd ϕ iff f(M, prot(ϕ)), w |= fd ϕ Proof. Given a state model M , and formula ϕ, we follow the procedure in Definition 4.3 and build a forest model f(M, prot(ϕ)). We do an induction on the structure of ϕ. The cases of atomic proposition, negation, knowledge and common knowledge are trivial. We only show the case with action modality.
Case ([A, a]ψ) ), w |= ft a syn(ψ) Proposition 4.7 For every executable ϕ ∈ L NTEL (i.e., a formula of the form syn(ψ) with ψ ∈ L DEL ), and every forest model M constructed from ψ with some initial state model, we have:
M, w |= ft ϕ iff is(M ), (w, w ∼1 , . . . , w ∼n ) |= it ϕ
Proof. Let a forest model M be given. We construct an action-based interpreted system is(M ) according to Definition 3.6. Let s w stand for (w, w ∼1 , . . . , w ∼n ). We do an induction on ϕ. We only show the case with temporal modality.
Case pre(a) → a ψ: M, w |= ft pre(a) → a ψ ⇔ M, w |= ft pre(a) ⇒ M, w |= ft a ψ ⇔ (♯) on condition of M, w |= pre(a) a run exists M, w |= ft pre(a) ⇒ M, (w, a) |= ft ψ ⇔ By induction is(M ), s w |= it pre(a) ⇒ is(M ), (s w , a) |= it ψ ⇔ (@) a run always exists is(M ), s w |= it pre(a) ⇒ is(M ), s w |= it a ψ ⇔ is(M ), s w |= it pre(a) → a ψ In step ♯ of the proof, this is guaranteed by the condition M, w |= ft pre(a): as the precondition of a is true, it can be executed and there is an → a accessible state from w. This is not guaranteed if pre(a) is false.
In step @ of the proof the required path always exists, as runs in interpreted systems are infinite. In particular, if s w = (r w , i), then (s w , a) (i.e., (w, (w, a) ∼1 , . . . , (w, a) ∼n )) is of the form (r ′ w , i + 1) where r ′ is equivalent to r to time i.
We emphasize that Proposition 4.7 does not hold for arbitrary formulas in our temporal epistemic fragment, because of the essential difference between forest models, where action sequences are finite, and corresponding interpreted systems, with infinite runs. More precisely: in case pre(a) → a ψ of the proof of Proposition 4.7 the precondition pre(a) is essential. States in forest models do not necessarily have an action successor, so that in such states all formulas of form a ψ are false, whereas runs in interpreted systems keep looping after a finite meaningful prefix, e.g. a q will always remain true if q is true. Now the generalization of Theorem 3.13 also holds. Given an epistemic state (M, w) and a formula ϕ in a dynamic epistemic logic, we construct an action-based interpreted system sem(M, ϕ) relative to that epistemic state and that formula. The construction involves the protocol implicitly present in the dynamic epistemic formula ϕ, i.e., the set of sequences of actions being executed to evaluate the formula, is made explicit. Then we show that ϕ is satisfied in the epistemic state (M, w) if and only if its syntactic translation syn(ϕ) in a temporal epistemic logic is satisfied in the corresponding interpreted system (sem(M, ϕ), s w ). We make two contributions in this paper. First of all, we have formalized something that is vaguely clear on a conceptual level: a connection between epistemic actions and time in well defined structures. We have adopted a more constructive approach in the sense that we made the protocols underlying a dynamic epistemic action, explicit in the corresponding interpreted system. And the mechanics of the syntactic translation and semantic transformation procedures are fully written out.
Secondly, our theorems provide a systematic approach to model check dynamic epistemic formulas using temporal epistemic formalisms. The large amount of work on model checking knowledge and time [8, 4, 27, 19, 5, 22] now becomes accessible for the community working on dynamic epistemic model checking as well. In particular, the temporal epistemic checkers mentioned [19, 5, 22] have all in common that they use interpreted systems as their semantics, and that they optimize search by implementing BDD techniques [11] , which has yet not been employed by the DEL community. We did not undertake a systematic analysis and comparison of the complexity of model checking in the different frameworks: this is surely important and work that needs to be addressed in the future.
